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6 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Alexander Artway thought that he had paid his debt to society by serving 
seventeen years in jail for a sex offense. After he was released, Artway settled in a 
community, secured employment, and married.  Then, on October 31, 1994, New Jersey enacted 
Megan's Law.  The Law requires certain sex offenders --including those like Artway found 
at sentencing to be "repetitive and compulsive" -- to register with local law enforcement.  
It also requires community notification for registrants deemed a future risk.  Artway 
sought an injunction against the enforcement of Megan's Law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that it punishes him, unconstitutionally, a second time. He 
also alleged that the Law provides insufficient procedural protections. 
 After summary proceedings in which no evidence was heard and virtually no 
factual record developed, the District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the 
notification aspects of Megan's Law violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution and enjoined their enforcement against Artway.  The court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Law's registration component.  Both sides appealed. 
 These cross appeals present numerous questions (some of which are quite 
difficult):  (1) Do the registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law constitute 
"punishment" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution? (2) Is Megan's Law unconstitutionally vague? 
(3) Does Megan's Law violate equal protection or due process? (4) Are any or all of 
Artway's claims unripe or moot? and (5) Was the district court's decision not to abstain 
under Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), proper?   
7 
 Timing is important not only to punishment, but also to proper judicial 
decisionmaking.  Although we reject the State's contention that Artway's claims are moot 
because he has moved from New Jersey, ripeness problems preclude us from reaching the 
lion's share of Artway's claims.  First, Artway's claims that Megan's Law's notification 
provisions violate the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses are 
unripe.  Sex offenders are subject to notification only if the prosecutor finds a 
significant risk of recidivism -- a determination that, with respect to Artway, has not 
yet been made and cannot be easily forecasted.  It is far from clear, therefore, that 
Artway will ever be subject to notification.  Moreover, we cannot make the novel, 
difficult, and fact-sensitive determination whether the notification provisions constitute 
"punishment" -- the central question under all three clauses -- without a record of how 
notification will be implemented and what concrete effects it will have on Artway (or 
those similarly situated).  Although Artway's contention that notification constitutes 
punishment is prima facie quite persuasive, the claim will be fit for judicial review only 
when Artway (or some other sex offender) submits to the notification process and the 
impact is chronicled in the record.  Similarly, since Artway has not yet been classified 
under Megan's Law, his claim that he is due more process for receiving notice of and 
challenging a hypothetical determination regarding his dangerousness is unripe. 
 With regard to Artway's claims that are currently justiciable, we hold first 
that Megan's Law's registration component does not violate the Ex Post Facto, Double 
Jeopardy, or Bill of Attainder Clauses as impermissible "punishment."  As the following 
discussion will show, the law on "punishment" is complicated and in some disarray.  We 
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devote a significant portion of this opinion, therefore, to explaining and synthesizing 
caselaw on the "punishment" issue in order to formulate the correct legal test. 
 We also hold that (1) the "repetitive and compulsive" classification of Megan's 
Law does not offend equal protection; (2) the alleged unreliability and unfairness of 
Artway's "repetitive and compulsive" determination does not violate due process; (3) 
Megan's Law is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; and (4) the district court 
did not err in refusing to abstain under Pullman. 
 We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it enjoins the 
enforcement of Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification under Megan's Law, and affirm that judgment 
insofar as it holds the registration provisions (including Tier 1 notification) of the Law 
constitutional. 
 
I.    BACKGROUND FACTS 
 In 1971, a New Jersey jury convicted Artway of sodomy. The statutory elements of 
Artway's crime did not require force, but the judge found that he had used violence and, 
as a result, sentenced him to an indefinite term in prison.  See Artway v. Pallone, 672 
F.2d 1168, 1170-71 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1982).0  In addition, based in part on a prior statutory 
rape conviction, the judge made a finding for sentencing purposes that Artway's conduct 
was "characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior."  See id.  After 
serving seventeen years of the sentence, Artway was released in 1992 (he had been a 
fugitive from 1971 to 1975). 
                     
0The victim testified that Artway and two friends took her to a wooded area, stripped her, 
tied her to a tree, urinated on her, forced her to pose nude for photographs, and 
sodomized her for over an hour.  See id. 
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   In 1994, the New Jersey legislature enacted Megan's Law -- formally the New 
Jersey's Sexual Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. 1994, Chs. 128, 133 (codified at 
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to 7-11) -- in response to public outcry following the brutal rape and 
murder of a seven-year-old girl, Megan Kanka.  Megan, her parents, and the community did 
not know that the murderer, who lived across the street from the Kankas, was a twice
convicted sex offender.  The legislation was rushed to the floor as an emergency measure, 
skipping the committee process, and was debated only on the floor; no member voted against 
it.  
 Megan's Law enacts a registration requirement and three tiers of notification.  
The registration provision requires all persons who complete a sentence for certain 
designated crimes involving sexual assault after Megan's Law was enacted to register with 
local law enforcement.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(1).  Those committing these offenses and 
completing all incarceration, probation, and parole before the Law's enactment must 
register only if, at the time of sentencing, their conduct was found to be "characterized 
by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior."  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2b(1).   
 The registrant must provide the following information to the chief law 
enforcement officer of the municipality in which he resides:  name, social security 
number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, address of 
legal residence, address of any current temporary legal residence, and date and place of 
employment.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4b(1).  He must confirm his address every ninety days, notify 
the municipal law enforcement agency if he moves, and re-register with the law enforcement 
agency of any new municipality.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2d to e. 
10 
 The registration agency then forwards the registrant's information, as well as 
any additional information it may have, to the prosecutor of the county that prosecuted 
the registrant. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-4c to d.  The prosecutor, in turn, forwards the information 
to the Division of State Police, which incorporates it into a central registry and 
notifies the prosecutor of the county in which the registrant plans to reside.  Id.
information is available to law enforcement agencies of New Jersey, other states, and the 
United States.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-5. The registration information is not open to public 
inspection. Law enforcement agencies are authorized to release "relevant and necessary 
information concerning registrants when . . . necessary for public protection," but o
in accordance with the notification procedures we describe below.  Failure of the sex 
offender to comply with registration is a fourth-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-5. 
 At this stage, the notification provisions are triggered.  The prosecutor of the 
county in which the registrant plans to live must consider the information provided 
through registration and, in consultation with the prosecutor of the convicting county, 
determine whether the registrant poses a low, moderate, or high risk of re-offense.  
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8d(1).  In making that determination, the prosecutor must consider 
guidelines the Attorney General has promulgated pursuant to the Act.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7
b. 
 The determination of risk as low, moderate, or high places the registrant in 
corresponding notification categories: Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3.  Under Tier 1 (low 
risk), the prosecutor must notify law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the 
registrant.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8c(1).  Under Tier 2 (moderate risk), the prosecutor, working 
with local law enforcement agencies, must notify schools, licensed day care centers, 
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summer camps, and designated community organizations involved in the care of children or 
the support of battered women or rape victims.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8c(2).  Under Tier 3 (high
risk), law enforcement agencies are required to notify members of the public likely to 
encounter the registrant.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8c(3).  
 The prosecutor makes this future risk determination using the "Registrant Risk 
Assessment Scale," promulgated by the Attorney General.  See Registration and Community 
Notification Bench Manual 26.  The Scale is a matrix of thirteen categories organized into 
four larger headings:  (1) Seriousness of Offense; (2) Offense History; (3) 
Characteristics of the Offender; and (4) Community Support.  Id.0  The prosecutor scores 
each of these categories for different levels of risk -- low, moderate, or high.  Id.
doing so, he or she is guided by commentary that includes factual examples.  Id. at 17
This initial risk score is multiplied by coefficients that differ by category, and the 
data is tabulated for a final risk assessment score.  Id. at 26.  Finally, the prosecutor 
must consider whether two exceptions apply.  "If an offender has indicated that he will 
reoffend if released into the community and the available record reveals credible evidence 
to support this finding, then the offender will be deemed a high risk . . . ."  Id.
Conversely, "if the offender demonstrates a physical condition that minimizes the risk of
reoffense, then the offender will be deemed to be a low risk."  Id. 
 The form of notification under Tiers 2 and 3 includes the registrant's name, a 
recent photograph, his physical description, offense, address, place of employment or 
                     
0The complete list of categories is as follows:  (1) Degree of Force; (2) Degree of 
Contact; (3) Age of Victim; (4) Victim Selection; (5) Number of Offenses/Victims; (6) 
Duration of Offensive Behavior; (7) Length of Time Since Last Offense; (8) History of 
Anti-Social Acts; (9) Response to Treatment; (10) Substance Abuse; (11) Therapeutic 
Support; (12) Residential Support; and (13) Employment/Educational Stability.  Id. 
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schooling, and a description and license plate number of the registrant's vehicle.  
39.  Those notified under Tier 2 are informed that the information is not to be shared 
with the general public, and every notification must contain a warning about the criminal 
consequences of vandalism, threats and assaults against the registrant or any of his 
associates.  Id. at 40. 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of Megan's Law 
in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995), read the following additional procedural protections 
into the statute.  First, Tier 2 notice must be confined to those likely to encounter the 
registrant. Id. at 29.  Second, the prosecutor must give the registrant notice, unless 
"impossible as a practical matter," before any Tier 2 or 3 notification.  Id. at 30
Third, a court must provide an opportunity for a judicial hearing, in camera, in which the 
registrant bears the burden of persuasion.  Id. at 31-32. 
 Because every registrant is classified at a minimum under Tier 1, this lowest 
level of notification accompanies every registration.  Tier 1 requires notice only to law 
enforcement, whereas Tier 2 and Tier 3 both result in notice to the community. 
Consequently, for purposes of the subsequent discussion, "registration" will include 
registration and Tier 1 notification, while "notification" will refer to Tier 2 and Tier 3 
notification. 
 
II.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Artway sought declaratory relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging that enforcement of Megan's Law against him would violate his federal 
constitutional rights, including equal protection, due process, and the right not to be 
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punished in violation of the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy 
Clauses.  The district court decided the case in the most summary fashion.  After the 
State moved to dismiss Artway's motion for injunctive relief, Artway urged the district 
court to construe his original motion as one for summary judgment.  The court obliged.  It 
allowed no discovery, heard no testimony, and made no findings of fact.  Instead, it ruled 
as a matter of law on all the complex issues pending before it.   
 The court opened its opinion by brushing aside a ripeness challenge to Artway's 
claims.  The court then held that the registration component of Megan's Law was 
constitutional, but that Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  
In doing so, it treated this case as an abstract issue of law.  The court recited caselaw 
on the Ex Post Facto, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy 
Clauses.  It also invoked state court cases, and, as might be expected, it discussed the 
Scarlet Letter.0  The resulting record contains only one piece of information describing 
the indirect effects of Megan's Law on Artway:  a copy of a Guardian Angel flier 
distributed in Artway's community warning people to "BEWARE."0   
 But even that evidence is not discussed in the district court's opinion.  
Instead, the court asserted that the registration component of Megan's Law is 
constitutional "for the reasons expressed in Arizona v. Noble, [829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 
1992)]."  Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 688 (D.N.J. 1995).  It then 
invalidated the notification provisions of Megan's Law using the seven-factor test for 
                     
0It also included To Kill a Mockingbird and Plato's Dialogues in its discussion of what 
constitutes "punishment."  
0Because Artway has never submitted to even the registration provisions of Megan's Law, 
the flier is not the result of notification.  Rather, Artway's notoriety seems to have 
flowed from this litigation. 
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punishment of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).  The court 
enjoined New Jersey, at first preliminarily and then permanently, from enforcing the 
notification provisions of Megan's Law.  It did not reach Artway's other arguments, such 
as the Due Process and Equal Protection challenges he presses before this Court. 
 Artway appeals the district court's ruling that registration and Tier 1 
notification are constitutional, and presses his Due Process and Equal Protection 
arguments should this Court find Tier 2 and Tier 3 constitutional.  The State appeals the 
district court's holding that Tier 2 and Tier 3 are unconstitutional.  At this juncture, 
these issues all present legal questions, subject to plenary review.0  See American 
Medical Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
III.  MOOTNESS 
 As a threshold matter, we reject the State's assertions that Artway's appeal is 
moot because he has moved out of New Jersey.  Artway no longer has a live claim, the State 
argues, because his move from New Jersey voided his duty to register. The State points us 
to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), in which the Supreme Court held
that environmentalists did not have injury in fact because they could not show any 
concrete evidence, such as a plane ticket, of their intent to return to the foreign 
country where the challenged environmental action would take place.  Like the 
                     
0One aspect of the propriety of Pullman abstention -- i.e., as to the question of 
disruption of important state policies -- is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See
Biegenwald v. Fauver, 882 F.2d 748, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1989).  However, this distinction 
plays no part in our analysis.  See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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environmentalists in Lujan, New Jersey argues, Artway's "bald assertion that he intends to 
return to New Jersey . . . rests on conjecture and is entirely hypothetical." 
 But if the record is clear on nothing else, it shows that Artway's obligation to 
register is keeping him from returning to New Jersey, and that situation presents a real 
controversy.  The litigants in Lujan merely opined that they planned to visit the site, in 
a foreign country, "some day" in the future.  504 U.S. at 564 & n.2.  Artway, in contrast, 
lived in New Jersey -- where he established a home, a family, and a job -- until March 3, 
1995.  He left shortly after Megan's Law was passed and has sworn that Megan's Law is 
keeping him from moving back.  Indeed, he brought this litigation, originally pro se
order to return there.  Artway cannot live in New Jersey without either complying with 
Megan's Law, which undoubtedly burdens him, or facing prosecution.  Especially given the 
constitutional right to move interstate, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), 
this Hobson's choice constitutes sufficient injury in fact even under Lujan's standing 
analysis. 
 In addition to being factually different from Lujan, the State's mootness claim 
is legally different from that case. Lujan addressed standing, which inquires whether 
someone is the proper party to bring a law suit at the beginning of the case. Doctrinally, 
to satisfy core Article III requirements, standing requires (1) that the plaintiff suffer 
injury in fact, (2) that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) 
that a favorable ruling would redress the injury.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.  
Mootness, on the other hand, asks whether a party who has established standing has now 
lost it because the facts of her case have changed over time.  Thus, the threshold for 
satisfying the prohibition against mootness is somewhat lower than that for standing.  
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"[T]he central question in mootness inquiries is whether changes in circumstances that 
prevailed at the beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful 
relief."  Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916 F.2d 85, 107 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan 
v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 981 (1995); accord Zellous v. Broadhead 
Associates, 906 F.2d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 1990) ("An action becomes moot when '(1) there is no 
reasonable expectation that the alleged events will recur . . . and (2) interim relief or 
events have completely eradicated the effects of the violation.'") (quoting County of Los 
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).0    
 The opportunity for meaningful relief is still present here.  Artway ceased the 
activity which unquestionably granted him standing -- living in New Jersey -- only upon 
threats of enforcement.  And he has sworn to his desire to return if Megan's Law is 
invalidated.  Cf. Begins v. Phillbrook, 513 F.2d 19, 24 (1975) (holding case not moot even 
though plaintiffs sold second automobile on threats of benefit termination when they 
demonstrated continuing desire to own two cars). 
IV.   RIPENESS 
A.  Introduction 
                     
0Mootness also contains four major exceptions:  (1) wrongs that have collateral 
consequences, see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53 (1968); (2) wrongs that are capable 
of repetition yet evading review, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); (3) wrongs that 
are voluntarily ceased but could resume, see United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 
(1953); and (4) wrongs to a class that continue though those to the named plaintiffs do 
not, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).  These exceptions are not directly applicable 
here, but they further demonstrate how mootness doctrine has diverged from standing 
doctrine to allow courts to decide real controversies in the face of changing 
circumstances.  
17 
  We next examine the State's assertions that Artway's ex post facto, double 
jeopardy, bill of attainder, and due process challenges are not ripe.  Article III, as 
part of its "case or controversy" mandate, requires parties to suffer injury or come into 
immediate danger of suffering an injury before challenging a statute.  See O'Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).  The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is 
"to prevent the courts, through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements."  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 
Ripeness prevents courts from interference with legislative enactments until it is 
necessary to do so, and enhances the quality of judicial decisionmaking by ensuring that 
cases present courts an adequate record to permit effective review and decisionmaking.  
See id.  Ripeness involves weighing two factors:  (1) the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration; and (2) the fitness of the issues for judicial review.  
See 387 U.S. at 149.0  
 
B.  The Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder,  
and Double Jeopardy Challenges 
 Artway contends that Megan's Law imposes unconstitutional punishment under the 
Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses.  Under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, the government may not apply a law retroactively that "inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed."  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
                     
0We have sometimes employed a three-part test for ripeness in the declaratory judgment 
context: (1) adversity of interest; (2) conclusivity; (3) utility.  See Step-Saver Data 
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990).  However, the Supreme 
Court's two-part test is of course still good law, and we continue to use that formulation 
as well.  See, e.g., New Hanover Tp. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 992 F.2d 
470 (3d Cir. 1993).  We deem the two-part analysis more apt for this case. 
18 
Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).  Under the Bill of Attainder Clause, legislatures are forbidden to 
engage in "[l]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial."  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448
49 (1965).  Finally, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits, inter alia, "a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction . . . and multiple punishments for the 
same offense."  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).   
 The crux of Artway's argument is that Megan's Law imposes unconstitutional 
"punishment."  In analyzing the ripeness of these challenges, we must carefully 
distinguish between the registration and notification provisions of Megan's Law.  We shall 
not, however, distinguish among the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double Jeopardy 
Clauses; their differences with respect to the requisites of "punishment," if any, are not 
relevant here. 
 
1. Hardship of Denying Review 
 The first factor for determining ripeness is the hardship of denying review.  
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.  The district court considered this factor, but failed to 
distinguish between the registration and notification aspects of Megan's Law. The hardship 
factor inquires whether the threat of prosecution is "credible," and not merely 
"speculative," so as to be concrete for purposes of Article III.  See Babbitt v. United 
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979).  Although preenforcement review is the 
exception rather than the rule, "[w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage 
in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by 
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a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be 
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."  
Id. (internal quotations omitted); accord Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) 
("[I]t is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or 
prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute he claims deters the exercise of his 
constitutional rights."); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 154 (holding a business's challenge to 
a labeling statute ripe even though the company had not been threatened specifically with 
prosecution).   
 This Court has afforded review even when the state has taken no active measures 
toward prosecution.  For example, in Presbytery of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio
40 F.3d 1454 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that a church pastor's preenforcement challenge to 
New Jersey's anti-discrimination law was ripe for adjudication when the pastor had 
announced his intention to speak against homosexuality even though the government had not 
actually threatened to prosecute.  That the state would not disavow the possibility of 
prosecution for activities outside the church was enough to make the threat "real and 
substantial."  Id. at 1468.  
 On the other hand, "[m]any cases deny ripeness on the straight-forward ground 
that the anticipated events and injury are simply too remote and uncertain to justify 
present adjudication."  13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3532.2, at 138 (1984).  A substantial contingency is the classic impediment to a 
preenforcement challenge.  For example, in New Hanover Tp. v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, 992 F.2d 470, 473 (3d Cir. 1993), we held that a challenge to construction of a 
municipal waste landfill was unripe because the state had not yet granted a necessary 
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water quality certificate.  Although the Army Corps of Engineers had granted another 
permit that the plaintiffs sought to challenge, we explained, construction of the landfill 
still could not commence: "[T]he effects of the Corps' deciding that [the project] may 
proceed . . . will not be felt in a concrete way unless and until the [state] grants [the 
project] a water quality certificate."  Id.; see also Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 
975-77 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding challenge to zoning decision unripe when review board had 
not yet made final decision); Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590, Int'l Ass'n of 
Firefighters v. City of Wilmington, Fire Dept., 824 F.2d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding 
challenge to yet uncreated promotion lists unripe because they were "purely a matter of 
conjecture").   
 Artway urges that both the registration and notification components of Megan's 
Law constitute unconstitutional "punishment" under the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and 
Bill of Attainder Clauses.  Artway's challenge to the registration provisions of Megan's 
Law satisfies the hardship prong.  Like the petitioners in Babbitt, Steffell, Abbott Labs.
and Florio, he faces the decision of complying with a putatively invalid law or suffering 
prosecution.  Registration presents no contingency for Artway.  If he resides in New 
Jersey, he must provide certain information to local law enforcement.  And the high 
profile of Megan's Law, and Artway's case in particular, virtually assures that Artway 
will be prosecuted if he engages in his allegedly protected conduct:  returning to New 
Jersey without registering.  In fact, the Attorney General assured the district court at 
oral argument that she would prosecute Artway if he failed to register.  See Artway v. 
Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 670 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995).  Under these circumstances, the 
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threat of prosecution Artway faces satisfies any test of the Supreme Court and of this 
Court: these threats are credible, real, and substantial. 
 In sharp contrast, Artway's challenge to the notification provisions of Megan's 
Law fails this prong.  Unlike registration, notification involves a crucial contingency:  
only if, after registering, Artway is classified as a moderate or high risk of re-offense 
will he face notification.  This classification hinges on a New Jersey prosecutor's future 
decision to be reached after applying the Attorney General's "Registrant Risk Assessment 
Scale."  See supra pages 12-13.  The State prosecutor, possessing the pertinent 
information not present in this record, scores these thirteen categories for different 
levels of risk, employing the corresponding eleven pages of guidelines.  The prosecutor 
then multiplies by differing coefficients, tabulates the data for a risk assessment sc
and considers whether exceptions apply. 
 As in New Hanover Township, Acierno, and Wilmington Firefighters, whether this 
contingency will ever come to pass is a matter of speculation.  We may not pass upon 
hypothetical matters.  And Artway faces no hardship from denying review of his 
notification challenges at this point.  If he registers, and if the State decides that his 
situation warrants community notification, he may seek to enjoin that action at that time. 
Thus, the "hardship" factor alone precludes review of Artway's notification claims.
2. Fitness of Issues for Judicial Review 
                     
0Similarly, we cannot rule on the claim of the Chief of Police of Woodbridge Township that 
state immunity bars his "potential liability" for a hypothetical § 1983 action seeking 
damages. Artway has filed no such suit.  To the extent the Police Chief's defense relates 
to the attorney's fees Artway is seeking, the Eleventh Amendment has no application to the 
award of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 
(1989).  
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 The second factor for evaluating ripeness, this one never mentioned by the 
district court, is whether the issues are fit for judicial review.  Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. 
at 149.  In making this determination, we must once again distinguish between the 
registration component of Megan's Law on the one hand, and the notification provisions on 
the other.  The principal consideration is whether the record is factually adequate to 
enable the court to make the necessary legal determinations.  The more that the question 
presented is purely one of law, and the less that additional facts will aid the court in 
its inquiry, the more likely the issue is to be ripe, and vice-versa.  Compare Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978) ("Although it is true 
that no nuclear accident has occurred and that such an occurrence would eliminate much of 
the existing scientific uncertainty surrounding this subject, it would not, in our view, 
significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented nor aid us in 
their resolution.") with Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965) ("[I]f we are to avoid 
rendering a series of advisory opinions, adjudication of the reach and constitutionality 
of [a statute under which the President prohibited travel to Cuba] must await a concrete 
fact situation.").   
 Courts are particularly vigilant to ensure that cases are ripe when 
constitutional questions are at issue.  See Communist Party of the United States v. 
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 81 (1961) (holding unripe an ex post facto 
challenge to Corrupt Practices Act especially in light of the rule to avoid unnecessary 
constitutional decisions).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held a constitutional challenge 
unripe because of the need for more detailed factual information in the record "[e]ven 
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though the challenged statute is sure to work the injury alleged."  Babbitt v. United Farm 
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 300 (1979). 
 Two Supreme Court cases illustrate the need for factual information particularly 
well.  In Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972), the Court dismissed as 
unripe a challenge on First Amendment grounds to a state law that required candidates to 
swear not to attempt to overthrow the government by violence or force.  The Court 
concluded that "the record . . . is extraordinarily skimpy in the sort of proved or 
admitted facts that would enable us to adjudicate this claim."  Id. at 587. Even assuming 
the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law, the Court continued, "their case has not 
given any particularity to the effect on them of Ohio's affidavit requirement."  Id.
588.  In California Banker's Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Court 
similarly declared unripe a First Amendment challenge to bank record-keeping and reporting 
requirements because of an insufficient factual record.  Id. at 56.  "This Court, i
absence of a concrete fact situation in which competing associational and governmental 
interests can be weighed, is simply not in a position to determine whether an effort to 
compel disclosure of such records would or would not be barred . . . ."  Id. 
 Megan's Law's registration provisions require simply that Artway register and 
provide information to the local prosecutor, who in turn may provide the information only 
to local law enforcement agents.  No private individuals or other organizations may 
receive this information.  Registration, therefore, involves few variables in its 
operation.  As in Duke Power, the issue is primarily one of law and further factual 
information will provide little assistance.  Under these circumstances, we are confident 
that Artway's registration challenge is fit for judicial review. 
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 The notification procedures, on the other hand, involve dissemination of 
potentially devastating information to undetermined numbers of private citizens.  Because 
these private citizens are not part of the trained state law enforcement mechanism, we are 
less certain how they will react.  For instance, the one study in the record chronicles a 
number of incidents of harassment at the hands of private citizens as a result of the 
State of Washington's notification law, but records no incidents on the part of law 
enforcement.  We also lack concrete record evidence about what Artway's future 
dangerousness classification will be, on what facts this classification will be 
determined, and who will be notified.0   
 Because Artway has not submitted to these procedures, and because the district 
court decided this case without admitting any appreciable evidence, we have almost no 
factual grounding on which to make an assessment about notification as applied to Artway.  
The record contains two pieces of data:  a flier distributed by the Guardian Angels 
warning Woodbridge residents to "BEWARE" and the brief State of Washington report 
                     
0We recognize that some of the critical factual information, especially the effects of the 
proposed notification on the registrant, will be difficult to chronicle.  In most cases, 
we assume that registrants slated for notification will seek to enjoin the notification 
before it happens.  The actual consequences of notification on that person, of course, 
cannot be known at that point.  Therefore, we wish to emphasize that our holding that this 
case is not ripe does not mean that all pre-notification challenges will be unripe.  Where 
the fact of notification is not speculative (because the state has expressed its intent to 
notify), the district court enjoys flexibility to collect appropriate evidence so that the 
issue may be fit for judicial review.  District courts may see fit to admit a broad array 
of evidence, including but not limited to (1) threats or actions against the registrant 
triggered by notice from channels other than Megan's Law, (2) threats or actions against 
similarly situated registrants, especially those undergoing notification, and (3) studies 
of the effects of Megan's Law or similar notification laws.  We do not suggest, however, 
that evidence of community reaction is mandatory before a notification challenge will be 
fit for judicial review.  
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describing the effects of a different law in that jurisdiction.0  While the tenor of the 
flier and the results of the study are worrisome indeed, they are but snippets compared to 
a developed record.  Consistent with the basic principles of Gilligan, Schultz et alia
cannot make complex and important determinations in a factual vacuum.   
 Moreover, the constitutionality of the notification provisions of Megan's Law 
may well turn on the most careful parsing of the Supreme Court's rulings on "punishment."  
Not only must we decide whether a multifaceted and novel0 regulatory scheme violates 
constitutional safeguards, we must also discern the parameters of these safeguards 
themselves.  As the discussion in Part V infra reveals, the law in this area, like an 
adolescent's room, needs tidying.  We may not undertake this task without factual tools.
                     
0In addition to telling Woodbridge residents to "BEWARE," the flier suggests that anti
registrant leafletting will be a regular result of notification:   
ATTENTION: Two time convicted rapist Artway, a 49 year old resident of 
the Avenel section of Woodbridge has successfully challenged Megan's 
Law.  After serving an 18 year sentence for sodomy. [sic] He cannot be 
made the subject of community notification.  Mr. Artway said "ya-hoo, 
I jump up in the air and click my heels. I can now move to another 
area -- in other words I can retreat -- and no fliers will follow me." 
(A247).  The flier concludes by urging Woodbridge residents to "keep an eye on Alexander 
Artway (track his movements)" and requests anonymous "information about his whereabouts."  
Id.  
 The State of Washington study reports that, of the 176 sex offenders who were 
subject to notification in that state between 1990 and 1993, 14 have suffered acts of 
harassment.  These incidents include the following:  rock and egg throwing, threats of 
arson, picketing, posting warning fliers throughout the community, and spray painting 
slogans like "Die, baby raper" and "Move or die" on the notification subject's home and 
personal property.  (A178). In half of the 14 cases, the harassment also extended to 
members of the offender's family, or to people living with the offender.  
0Although forty states have sex offender registration statutes, twenty-nine of these laws 
have been passed since 1990.  See Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification and 
the Constitution, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 117, 120 (1995).  Moreover, of the minority 
of states whose laws permit community notification, New Jersey's is the most far-reaching.  
See id.; Doe, 142 N.J. at 41 n.9.  
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 Thus, Artway's challenge to the notification provisions of Megan's Law fails 
both prongs of the ripeness test.  The district court erred because, in analyzing the 
hardship of denying review, it did not distinguish between registration and notific
it also omitted the fitness for judicial review prong entirely.  Whether Artway will ever 
be subject to Megan's Law's notification requirements remains a matter of speculation, and 
the record lacks the factual information necessary for this Court to decide Artway's 
notification claims consistent with its Article III obligations.   
 
C. Due Process Claims 
 Two of Artway's due process claims are also unripe. Artway argues that Megan's 
Law denies him due process because, to avoid notification, he bears the burden of 
persuasion to demonstrate that he is not a risk of future danger.  He also claims that 
Megan's Law does not provide adequate notice of the State's intention to initiate 
notification.  The district court did not reach these issues because it held the 
notification provisions of Megan's Law unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause.  
Since we have already discussed ripeness extensively, we analyze these claims more 
briefly.  
 
1. Burden of Persuasion 
 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from denying "life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  For purposes of this 
analysis, we will assume that notification under Megan's Law implicates a liberty interest 
under state law sufficient to invoke federal due process protections.  Doe found such an 
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interest.  See 142 N.J. at 104; accord Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (holding 
that Due Process Clause protects state created liberty interests as well as federal).  
cf. Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-2300 (1995) (rejecting Hewitt's methodology of 
examining state regulations rather than nature of deprivation in determining existence of 
liberty interest and suggesting limits on scope of state-created liberty interests that 
trigger federal due process safeguards). 
 Due process is a flexible concept determined by application of a three-part 
balancing test:  (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of 
error imposed by the procedure created by the State; and (3) the countervailing interest 
in using the procedures it adopted.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
This test applies to burdens of proof.  See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 n.1 
(1993).   
 Artway argues that all three factors of the Mathews test counsel rejection of 
the State's procedure, which places the burden of persuasion on the sex offender to prove 
that he is not dangerous in order to avoid notification.  Rather, Artway contends, the 
State should bear the burden of persuasion and that burden should be by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Artway submits that (1) his private interest in not being branded a 
dangerous sex offender is very great; (2) the fact that the State possesses greater 
resources counsels that it should bear a greater share of the burden (especially when 
Artway is called on to "prove the negative," i.e., that he is not dangerous); and (3) the 
State's interest is in getting the determination right, not in notifying in all cases.  
Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (state bears burden of persuasion by clear and 
28 
convincing evidence for parental-rights termination); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 
(1979) (same for civil commitment proceedings). 
 Artway also asserts that judicial deference to the prosecutor's findings 
violates due process by establishing a constitutionally excessive presumption against him.  
Cf. Virgin Islands v. Parrilla, 7 F.3d 1097 (3d Cir. 1993) (striking down statute creating 
rebuttable mandatory presumption).  Under Megan's Law, the judge "shall affirm the 
prosecutor's determination unless . . . persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that 
it does not conform to the laws and the Guidelines."  Doe, 142 N.J. at 32.  
 Although Artway's challenges on these issues are forceful, his claims are not 
ripe.  That he will ever confront the process he challenges is entirely speculative at 
this point. This process is available to contest notification decisions, and Artway would 
be the subject of notification (as opposed to merely registration) only if he is 
classified as a Tier 2 (moderate risk) or Tier 3 (high risk) offender.   While we know 
that Artway will be prosecuted if he does not register, we do not know whether, even if he 
does register, he will ever need to utilize the process he challenges. 
 
2.  Notice 
 Due process requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections."  Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950).  Artway argues that Megan's Law does not provide for adequate notice of the 
commencement of notification proceedings.  The Law requires notice to registered sex 
offenders classified as Tier 2 or Tier 3 before the corresponding notification occurs.  
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However the Act, as interpreted by Doe, dispenses with notice when "impossible as a 
practical matter." 142 N.J. at 30-31.  An erroneous notification would inflict an 
irreparable deprivation of his liberty interest, Artway argues, so that the State can 
never dispense with notice (and his corresponding right to a hearing).  See United States 
v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[A] likelihood of irreparable harm 
resulting from the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing is a private interest which 
countervails any public interest in streamlined administration.").   
 But Artway's notice claim is unripe for the same two reasons as his "punishment" 
and burden of persuasion challenges. First, his need for notice about proposed 
notification is speculative.  Artway will need notice only if he is classified as a Tier 2 
or Tier 3 risk.  Second, the record in this case is insufficient to make this 
determination.  The question is whether the notice requirement of Megan's Law satisfies 
the strictures of due process.  Mullane makes clear that the right to notice is not 
absolute; rather, Artway has a right to "reasonably calculated" notice.  339 U.S. at 314.  
And Raffoul demonstrates that the State cannot dispense with notice when that notice is 
possible and irreparable harm could result. 826 F.2d at 224.  Against this legal backdrop, 
we must evaluate Megan's Law's "impossible as a practical matter" standard, but we have no
factual matrix against which to evaluate this standard because Artway has not submitted to 
Megan's Law.0  
 
                     
0Furthermore, the state court has not yet interpreted this standard.  To the extent state 
court interpretation would make the standard comport with due process, abstention would 
probably be appropriate even if the issue were ripe.  See Railroad Commission v. Pullman
312 U.S. 496 (1941).  We assume that Artway will be entitled to notice, since his 
whereabouts seem to be known, so long as he does not pose an immediate danger. 
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D. Summary of Unripe Claims 
 In summary, we conclude that Artway's ex post facto, double jeopardy, bill of 
attainder, and due process challenges to Megan's Law's notification provisions are not 
ripe.0  We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it holds Tier 2 
and Tier 3 notification unconstitutional, and direct it to dismiss Artway's due process 
claims to the extent they concern notification. 
 
V.    REGISTRATION 
A. "Punishment" Under the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder,  
and Double Jeopardy Clauses 
 We turn now to the merits of Artway's ripe challenge: that the registration
provisions of Megan's Law violate the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Double 
Jeopardy Clauses.  We begin by recapping the nature of those protections.  The 
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law."  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.  Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the government may not apply a 
                     
0Artway's contention at oral argument that his challenge is both facial and as-applied 
does nothing to overcome his ripeness problem.  In the limited context of the First 
Amendment, a facial challenge allows a litigant to argue that a law is unconstitutional 
in a set of circumstances not necessarily present in his own case -- on the basis of its 
"overbreadth."  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  Artway's 
challenge obviously does not rely on the First Amendment.  To make a successful facial 
challenge in a non-First Amendment context, a litigant "must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."  Id.  Artway has made no 
contention, let alone proved it, that notification under Megan's Law would be 
unconstitutional under all circumstances.  For example, his "punishment" claims, which all 
rely on some notion of retroactivity, would fail if the sex offender committed his crime 
after Megan's Law was enacted.  In any event, a facial challenge does not -- and cannot 
excuse basic Article III case or controversy requirements, such as that the plaintiff 
actually be aggrieved by the challenged statute. 
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law retroactively that "inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, 
when committed."  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).   
 The Constitution also forbids states to "pass any Bill of Attainder."  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 10.0  Under the Bill of Attainder Clause, legislatures are forbidden to 
enact "[l]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named 
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial."  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448
49 (1965).   
 Finally, the Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  "[T]he 
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits, inter alia, "a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction . . . and multiple punishments for the same offense."  United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).  The threshold question under each clause, therefore, is 
whether the registration provisions of Megan's Law impose "punishment."  If registration 
does not impose punishment, our inquiry with respect to the registration issue is at an 
end.0 
                     
0Underlining the importance of these clauses in the eyes of the Framers, the Bill of 
Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses apply to both the federal government and the states by 
the original terms of the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of 
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ("No State 
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post facto Law . . . ."). 
0While even Artway's ex post facto claim fails, we think that it is probably his best 
challenge.  Bills of attainder inflict punishment "without a judicial trial."  Brown
U.S. at 448-49. Artway, of course, has had a trial, at which he was convicted of the crime 
triggering registration.  The real complaint is not that the legislature has circumvented 
the judicial process, but that it has changed the results of that process.  This is the 
essence of an ex post facto challenge.   
 Double jeopardy is probably a stronger challenge than the bill of attainder 
claim, but it too has its drawbacks.  Ex post facto laws are particularly objectionable 
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 We must sort through several key cases involving these various provisions to 
derive (or, perhaps more appropriately given the confused state of the law, "divine") the 
test for punishment.  In the end, we develop a multi-part test that looks to the 
legislature's subjective purpose in enacting the challenged measure, its "objective" 
purpose in terms of proportionality and history, and the measure's effects.   
1. De Veau v. Braisted:  Subjective Purpose 
 We start with De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), in which the Supreme 
Court announced a subjective (or actual) legislative purpose test.  In that case, the 
Court upheld, against bill of attainder and ex post facto challenges, a law forbidding 
certain unions employing former felons from collecting dues.  In effect, the law barred 
                                                                                          
because they deprive their object of all notice.  See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 
423, 429 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981).  In contrast, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause bars the imposition of a second "punishment" in a separate proceeding even 
though the punishment was authorized at the time of the crime but just not sought at the 
same time as the first punishment.  In addition, seven judges of the Ninth Circuit have 
recently pointed out the practical problem with broadly interpreting forfeitures as 
constituting "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes:  those who forfeit illegal 
proceeds at the time of their arrest cannot be criminally prosecuted.  See United States 
v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 56 F.3d 41, 42 (9th Cir. 1995) (Rymer, J., with whom Hall, 
Wiggins, Kozinski, O'Scannlain, Trott, and Nelson, J.J., join, dissenting from denial of 
rehearing).  Given these equitable and practical factors, courts may be more reluctan
deem measures "punishment" in a double jeopardy challenge, especially to the extent they 
must make difficult judgment calls under the test described infra. 
 Indeed, at least one Justice has noted the equitable factor in arguing that 
double jeopardy does not bar punishing twice.  See United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 
555 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The short of it is that where two such 
proceedings merely carry out the remedies which Congress has prescribed in advance for a 
wrong, they do not twice put a man in jeopardy for the same offense.").  Of course, 
Justice Frankfurter's position has not carried the day.  But two current Justices have 
recently expressed their view that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to multiple 
punishments.  See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-59 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., with whom Thomas, J., joins, dissenting) ("'To be put in jeopardy' does not 
remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its terms this provision prohibits, not multiple 
punishments, but only multiple prosecutions."). 
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convicted felons from working on the New York and New Jersey waterfront.  The Court 
explained that "[t]he question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to 
bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish 
that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes 
about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the 
qualifications of a profession."  Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
 "The proof is overwhelming," the Court continued, "that New York sought not to 
punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of 
the waterfront, and for the effectuation of that scheme it became important whether 
individuals had previously been convicted of a felony." Id.  This early case, emphasized 
by New Jersey, suggests that actual legislative purpose is the only inquiry.  But 
subsequent cases make clear that this is no longer true. 
 
2. United States v. Halper:  Objective Purpose through Proportionality 
  
 Almost thirty years later, in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), the 
Court articulated an "objective" legislative intent test -- the test central to the 
arguments of both Artway and the State.  Halper held that a sizeable fine, imposed in a 
civil proceeding after the defendant's conviction for Medicare fraud, violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  The Court analyzed the issue by determining whether the fine served the 
purposes of punishment, including retribution and deterrence, or instead satisfied a 
remedial purpose.  "Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes 
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punishment," the Court said, "when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves 
the goals of punishment."  Id.    
We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin 
aims of retribution and deterrence.  Furthermore, retribution and 
deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.  
From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot be 
fairly said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be 
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand that term.   
Id. at 448 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).   
 The Court found that the fine in that case -- $130,000 -- bore "no rational 
relation" to the legitimate remedial purpose -- compensating the government for its 
$16,000 in costs.  Id. at 449.  Therefore, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
barred the additional civil sanction after criminal punishment "to the extent that the 
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution."  Id. at 448-49.0    
                     
0Seemingly inconsistent language in Halper has perplexed some courts.  Therefore, we 
explain in the margin how we think all the parts fit together.  Halper declared: From 
these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to 
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.  
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been 
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to 
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but 
as a deterrent or retribution. 
490 U.S. at 448-49 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).   
 On an initial reading, the first "solely" clause of the first sentence and the 
second "only" sentence seem to point in a different direction than the "only be expla
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes" language on which we base our 
analysis.  
 But the various parts of this excerpt can be reconciled; indeed they must since 
the majority in Halper certainly thought its declarations in this passage were consistent.  
As we illustrate with our subsequent soupmeat hypothetical, a measure is "punishment" if 
it can "only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes."  In 
other words, if the measure is excessive in relation to its proffered remedial purpose, it 
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 Because Halper occupies such a central role in the punishment inquiry, a number 
of explanatory observations are in order.  The first is a matter of semantics:  a clear 
understanding of the terms "retributive," "deterrent," and "remedial" is critical to 
applying the Halper test.  We therefore explain how we think the Supreme Court is using 
the terms; at least the reader will know how we are using them.  Retribution is vengeance 
for its own sake.  It does not seek to affect future conduct or solve any problem except 
realizing "justice." Deterrent measures serve as a threat of negative repercussions to 
discourage people from engaging in certain behavior.  Remedial measures, on the other 
hand, seek to solve a problem, for instance by removing the likely perpetrators of future 
corruption instead of threatening them (De Veau), or compensating the government for costs 
incurred (Halper). 
 Of course, as the cases point out, a measure could serve all three functions.  
For instance, putting someone in jail for a sex offense serves the retributive function of 
hurting that person, the deterrent purposes of convincing him and others not to engage in 
that behavior to avoid the adverse consequences, and the remedial purpose of keeping him 
                                                                                          
will be "punishment."  The second sentence says the same thing if one focuses on the 
"fairly be characterized" language.  A measure may not "fairly be characterized as 
remedial," but rather may fairly be characterized "only as a deterrent or retribution" if 
it can "only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes."  And 
the first "solely" part of the first sentence, like the second sentence, can be reconciled 
with the rest of the paragraph by focusing on the words "fairly be said" (as opposed to 
just "be said") and "serve that purpose" (as opposed to have that effect). 
 This reading of the paragraph is consistent with the other language in the 
opinion (such as its "rational relation" discussion), the analysis of the case, and its 
holding:  that the fine in question was punishment to the extent it vastly exceeded the 
government's remedial purpose -- recouping its costs of prosecution -- because such an 
excessive fine can only be explained as also serving either deterrent or retributive 
purposes.  
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away from others (at least outside the prison).  Another complication is that measures can 
have one or more of these effects without having that purpose. 
 With this lexicon in mind, we turn to an explication of the Halper calculus, 
which evaluates the proportionality of ends to means.  To recapitulate, the Halper test is 
whether "a civil sanction that cannot be fairly said solely to serve a remedial purpose, 
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, 
is punishment."  Id. at 448. (emphasis added).  The threshold question is thus whether a 
remedial purpose can explain the sanction.  Only if the remedial purpose is insufficient 
to justify the measure, and one must resort also to retributive or deterrent 
justifications, does the measure become punitive.  Only then can the measure "only be 
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes." 
 To illustrate with a venerable statutory interpretation hypothetical, assume 
that someone is sent to the store in the snow for soupmeat.  The trip can be explained 
solely by the remedial purpose of obtaining food, even though the trip through the cold 
could also serve retributive purposes.  See id. at 447 n.7 ("[O]ur cases have acknowledged 
that for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.").  It 
therefore qualifies as non-punishment under Halper.  On the other hand, assume now that, 
without additional justification, the agent is sent without clothes.  This additional 
aspect of the trip cannot be explained by the remedial purpose of obtaining food; this 
excursion can only be explained as partly serving retributive purposes.  It therefore 
constitutes "punishment" under the Halper test.0 
                     
0In his concurrence, Judge Shadur intimates that we may have overresolved Halper.  
[slip op. at 5].  We disagree.  Our task, we believe, is to derive a general rule from the 
Supreme Court's precedents and apply it to the facts of this case, not tailor a specific 
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 Halper thus contributes an important element to our analysis:  it adds an 
objective inquiry to supplement the actual legislative purpose test of De Veau.  "This 
constitutional protection is intrinsically personal.  Its violation can be identified only 
by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the 
machinery of the state."  Id. at 447; see also id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
("Today's holding, I would stress, constitutes an objective rule that is grounded in the 
nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case.").0   
 By acknowledging that "civil" penalties may constitute punishment, Halper
departs from the practice of placing talismanic significance on the legislative labels 
affixed to the disputed provision and searching for the frequently unknowable and 
nondispositive subjective intent of the legislative body: "[T]he labels 'criminal' and 
                                                                                          
rule to the facts.  We also disagree with Judge Shadur's view that the "rule for a rare 
case" language of Halper limits the general ends-means test of that case.  Id.  As the 
words Judge Shadur quotes make clear, the "rule" is not the general Halper calculus, but 
the holding of that case:  that only under the extreme factual circumstances of Halper
does a fixed-penalty provision constitute "punishment" under the general means-ends test.  
In any event, we agree with Judge Shadur that our differences in this complex case are 
small indeed.   
0Even though Halper was a double jeopardy case, its move away from subjective purpose 
should apply to ex post facto and bill of attainder claims as well.  The Court explained 
that the subjective approach was appropriate in "identifying the inherent nature of a 
proceeding, or in determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany those 
proceedings."  490 U.S. at 447; see also infra pages 56-59 and accompanying notes 
(discussing cases interpreting this different protection under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments). However, the Court continued, "the approach is not well suited to the 'humane 
interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple 
punishments."  Id.  The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses, of course, implicate 
the same "humane interests" as double jeopardy protections.  The move to a more objective 
analysis, therefore, is better understood as a change of approach than as resting on any 
fundamental difference in the nature of double jeopardy, ex post facto, and bill of 
attainder protections. 
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'civil' are not of paramount importance. . . .  The notion of punishment . . . cuts across 
the division between the civil and the criminal law."  Id. at 447-48.0   
 The Halper objective ends-means test is a step down the road to limiting 
especially harsh effects, but still any "sting" could be permissible with a sufficient 
post hoc remedial "purpose."  For example, the need for supper could explain the trip 
through the snow even if the temperature were below zero. 
 
3. Austin v. United States:  Objective Purpose through History 
 Four years after Halper, in Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), the 
Court added yet another dimension to the punishment question: a focus on history.  The 
Court held that civil forfeiture is "punishment" subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.  The government had argued that forfeiture of a mobile home and body 
shop after the owner was convicted of a drug offense served the remedial purpose of 
compensating the government for its costs in investigating and prosecuting these offenses.  
In setting out the appropriate analysis, the Austin Court rescribed the key passage
Halper. 
  We said in Halper that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained 
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the term." 
Id. at 2806 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448). 
                     
0In moving past exclusive reliance on subjective legislative intent, the Court partly 
heeded the admonition of Justice Frankfurter, expressed almost half a century earlier, 
that such "dialectical subtleties" were an unworkable approach to "punishment" 
jurisprudence.  See United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943).  
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 The Austin Court then took a different tack than the Halper Court: it applied 
the Halper test primarily by examining history, rather than proportionality.  "We turn, 
then, to consider whether, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, forfeiture was 
understood at least in part as punishment and whether forfeiture under [the statute in 
question] should be so understood today."  Id.  Examining history, it concluded that 
forfeiture has traditionally been regarded as punishment. Looking to the language and 
legislative history of the statute as a whole, the Court determined that these factors 
confirmed that the forfeiture statute served a punitive purpose, regardless of the 
proportionality of the particular forfeiture to the government's costs.0  Id. at 2810
It therefore remanded for a determination whether the forfeiture, by being "excessive," 
violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id.    
 According to Austin, a measure that has historically served punitive purposes is 
punishment unless the text or legislative history shows a contrary purpose.  Id. at 2810 
("We find nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the 
historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment.").  Thus, even if a remedial purpose 
                     
0Thus, Halper and Austin are somewhat in tension.  Halper, examining the proportionality 
of the fine in question to the government's costs, held that a fine was "punishment" 
to the extent it was disproportionate to the government's costs.  490 U.S. 448-49.  
Austin, relying primarily on history and looking at the statute as a whole (rather than 
the particular forfeiture in question), holds that forfeiture is "punishment" regardless
of its proportionality to the government's costs.  113 S. Ct. at 2811-12 & n.14.  
 After a cursory attempt to distinguish Halper in a footnote, Austin explains 
that it makes "little practical difference whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to 
all forfeitures under [the relevant statute] or only to those that cannot be characterized 
as purely remedial."  Id.  "The Clause prohibits only the imposition of 'excessive' 
fines," the Court explained, "and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be 
considered 'excessive' in any event."  Id.  This may be so, but it collapses Austin
Eighth Amendment analysis into Halper's double jeopardy inquiry:  "punishment" is not 
excessive if it is not "punishment."   
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could fully explain a measure, thereby satisfying Halper, it will not pass Austin muster 
if it has historically been considered punishment and neither the text nor the legislative 
history contradicts this purpose.  To draw again on our soupmeat hypothetical, sending 
someone out into the snow would be punishment if doing so was traditionally regarded as 
punitive and the sender did not make his plausible remedial purposes clear.  This would be 
the case even though a remedial purpose -- fetching soupmeat -- could fully explain the 
action.  Without a convincing counterrationale, something understood as punishment for so 
long simply "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only 
be explained as also serving retributive or deterrent purposes."  Id. at 2806. 
 The Austin objective purpose analysis also represents a move toward analyzing 
the effect of a provision in ascertaining whether it inflicts "punishment."0  Though it 
speaks of legislative "purpose," the more likely and appropriate concern in a historical 
inquiry is the nature of the measure itself.  Even the text and legislative history 
inquiry of Austin can be understood as going more to the nature of the provision itself 
rather than the subjective intent of the legislators. 
 In concluding our discussion of Austin, we must question whether, as some courts 
have assumed, that case establishes that "punishment" for purposes of one constitutional 
protection is necessarily "punishment" for another.  See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. 
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We believe that the only fair reading of 
                     
0This transition was presaged in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 
354 (1984).  In that case, the Court held that double jeopardy did not bar a civil 
proceeding seeking forfeiture of firearms after the owner was acquitted in a separate 
criminal proceeding.  Though the Court still placed decisive weight on actual legislative 
purpose, it also inquired "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in purpose 
effect as to negate that intention."  Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added).  
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Austin is that it resolves the 'punishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause."), amended 
on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996).  This 
Court, noting the tension between Halper and Austin, has rejected the Ninth Circuit's 
reading of Austin as resolving all forfeitures under § 881 as presumptively punishment for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. 
Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting holding and reasoning of United States v. 
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994)).0   
 Nevertheless, we believe that the historical methodology of Austin, as opposed 
to its broad language and holding, must be applicable to other punishment determinations: 
historical analysis is a staple of constitutional interpretation, including those 
guarantees dealing with "punishment."  Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
U.S. 425, 475 (1977) (examining history to determine whether access restrictions on 
                     
0While this Court has rejected $405,089.23, we do not agree entirely with the reasoning of 
the Ninth Circuit dissenters from the denial of rehearing.  The dissent criticizes the 
opinion as merging "the inquiry for excessive fines cases -- whether the amount forfeited 
is partly punishment -- into double jeopardy cases, where the issue is whether the amount 
forfeited is entirely punishment."  56 F.3d at 43.   
 This is incorrect.  Austin adds a historical analysis (and examines the statute 
as a whole rather than the specific measure in question), but it does not change the 
underlying nature of the Halper calculus.  In fact, Austin follows its statement that it 
must determine whether this forfeiture serves "in part to punish" by quoting the standard 
from Halper and citing that case. If this were not clear enough, the Court explains the 
"relevant question" again later in the opinion as being the Halper analysis: "Under 
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901, 1104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989), the 
question is whether the forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not exclude the 
possibility that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that conclusion."  113 S. Ct. 
at 2810 n.12.  The question is not whether the measure is "partly punishment" or "entirely 
punishment"; the question is whether it is "punishment."  And a measure that serves
part to punish (as opposed to merely having some negative effect) is "punishment." 
Halper calculus is admittedly somewhat confusing, but we have done our best to explicate 
it above.  See supra pages 38-44 and accompanying notes.           
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presidential papers constituted "punishment" for Bill of Attainder Clause); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 590 n.23 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Supreme Court "has 
probably relied upon historical analysis more often than on any of the other objective 
factors . . . [to] determin[e] whether some government sanction is punitive.") (citing 
cases). 
 
4. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch:  Objective Purpose and Deterrence 
 One year after deciding Austin, the Court added another wrinkle in Department of 
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), announcing that the "no deterrent purpose" 
rule of Halper and Austin does not apply in all situations.  Kurth Ranch held that 
Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Montana law, which 
taxed illegal drugs and equipment at rates up to 400 percent, constituted "punishment" 
because it was "a concoction of anomalies, too far removed in crucial respects from a 
standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double 
Jeopardy analysis."  Id. at 1948.  Because Montana levied this tax in a separate 
proceeding, after the defendants were tried and sentenced, this punishment violated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.   
 Kurth Ranch further expanded on the historical inquiry begun in Austin.  It 
distinguished the rule of Halper -- that any deterrent purpose makes a law punishment 
on the ground that fines and forfeitures "are readily characterized as sanctions" whereas 
taxes have typically served the salutary0 purpose of raising revenue.  Id. at 1946.  Thus, 
                     
0We use the term "salutary" to include both remedial and otherwise beneficial goals.
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the Court explained, a high tax rate and even a deterrent purpose would not automatically 
render a tax punitive.  Id. at 1947.   
 The Court then examined whether the particular tax at issue operated in the 
usual manner of most taxes.  It differentiated among taxes with a pure revenue raising 
purpose, mixed-motive taxes imposed both to deter a disfavored activity and to raise 
revenue, and taxes imposed upon illegal activities. Pure revenue raising taxes are not 
"punishment," the Court said, because they are imposed despite their negative effect on 
the taxed activity.  Id.  Even mixed-motive taxes, such as those imposed on cigarette 
sales, are not "punishment" because the government wishes the activity to continue to the 
extent that its benefits -- including tax revenues -- outweigh its harms. However, the 
Court found that these salutary justifications "vanish when the taxed activity is 
completely forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support such a 
tax could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction."  
The Court held that because a tax on illegal drugs did not operate in the usual manner, 
the historically non-punitive purposes of taxes could not insulate this tax from being 
considered "punishment."  Id. at 1948.   
 The main significance of the Kurth Ranch limitation is that, at least for 
measures that have historically served salutary functions, even some deterrent purpose
will not render a measure "punishment":  "We begin by noting that neither a high rate of 
taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this tax a form of 
punishment."  Id. at 1946 (emphasis added).  In these cases, courts must examine whether 
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the particular measure at issue operates in a "usual" manner consistent with its 
historically salutary or mixed purposes.0 
                     
0Thus, we disagree with the First Circuit's understanding of Kurth Ranch and Halper
situations involving neither fines nor taxes.  See United States v. Stoller, No. 95
1996 WL 77883 (1st Cir. Feb. 29, 1996).  Stoller argues that Kurth Ranch supplies the 
general rule -- which Stoller dubs the "totality of circumstances" test -- while Halper
an "exception" for "monetary" penalties. 
 We are unpersuaded by Stoller's limitation of Halper. Cabining Halper to 
"monetary" penalties is not supported by the broad language of that case.  Reading nothing 
in Halper so strictly limiting it, we are loath to read it so narrowly without instruction 
from the Supreme Court.  Stoller claims that the Supreme Court gave such an instruction in 
Kurth Ranch.  But we read nothing in Kurth Ranch indicating that it supplies the general 
rule and Halper provides the exception.  The majority opinion in Kurth Ranch, quoting 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent therein, explains that because "tax statutes serve a 
purpose quite different from civil penalties, . . . Halper's method of determining whether 
the exaction was remedial or punitive 'simply does not work in the case of a tax 
statute.'"  114 S. Ct. at 1948.  If so, then why not read Kurth Ranch as an "exception" 
for tax cases?  What makes Kurth Ranch the general rule and Halper the exception in cases 
involving neither fines nor taxes?  We believe that the better course when evaluating a 
measure that is neither a "civil penalty" nor a "tax" is to synthesize both Halper and 
Kurth Ranch and generalize them to the extent their language will support.   
 We think that Stoller's limited reading of Halper may stem from a 
misunderstanding of the Halper calculus.  Stoller states that, unlike monetary sanctions, 
many non-monetary sanctions "cannot fairly be characterized as serving only punitive 
purposes." 1996 WL 77883, at *6 (emphasis added).  It thus suggests, incorrectly, that 
this is what Halper requires.  As footnote 16 of our opinion describes in detail, a 
measure constitutes "punishment" under Halper if it may "fairly be characterized only
deterrent or retribution."  490 U.S. at 449.  The accurate placement of the "only" 
modifying "characterized" instead of "punitive" --changes the meaning of that phrase 
entirely, making the test much less strict than the First Circuit reads it.    
 We also disagree with Stoller's rationale that Halper is limited to "monetary" 
penalties because only "fines, forfeitures, and other monetary penalties . . . are 
quantifiable in actual or approximate monetary terms."  1996 WL 77883, at *5.  While 
judging the proportionality of ends to means may be slightly more difficult in a non
monetary setting, courts compare qualitative means to qualitative ends all the time.  
Courts regularly use ends-means analysis in equal protection and due process cases to 
evaluate difficult-to-quantify rights (liberty, free speech, free exercise) like the one 
at issue here.  The feasibility of applying Halper generally is demonstrated by our 
soupmeat hypothetical, as well as the many cases that have used the calculus to determine 
the constitutionality of revoking drivers' licenses for drunk driving. See, e.g., Maryland 
v. Jones, 666 A.2d 128 (Md. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 WL 26460 (Mar. 18, 1996).    
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 Kurth Ranch also reemphasizes that at least some negative effect on the 
defendant does not convert a measure into "punishment."  "We note[], however, that whether 
a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective, as 




5. California Department of Corrections v. Morales: Effect 
 
 Most recently, California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597 
(1995), contributed two additional elements to the "punishment" analysis: it further 
shifts the focus from a law's purpose to its effect, and it establishes that the 
                                                                                          
 Furthermore, we think that Stoller's strict limitation of Halper is inconsistent 
with Stoller's own approach.  Indeed, after arguing for Halper's inapplicability to its 
own case, Stoller itself proceeds to apply Halper.  See 1996 WL 77883, at *12 ("Halper
expressly recognizes that civil sanctions need not be precisely calibrated in order to 
survive scrutiny under the Double Jeopardy Clause as long as they work 'rough remedial 
justice.'  We think this principle is fully transferable to the debarment context.") 
(citation omitted).    
 Stoller's attack on Halper is also unnecessary to its result.  Even under our 
approach, which uses Halper to analyze proportionality as part of a larger test, the 
limited debarment order challenged in Stoller would not constitute "punishment."  We would 
be hard pressed to conclude otherwise in view of the Supreme Court's decision in the 
factually similar cases of De Veau and Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
 Nevertheless, our approach differs from the First Circuit's in our application 
of Halper to this situation.  Given our broader test incorporating DeVeau, Austin, 
Ranch, and Morales, we do not think that exclusive reliance on Halper is proper.  But 
Halper is not inapplicable, "dysfunctional," or particularly strict in non-monetary 
settings such as this.  And Stoller's "totality of the circumstances" test, which it 
purports to extract from Kurth Ranch, is neither described as such by that opinion nor 
sufficiently determinate to be helpful (like the similar Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
U.S. 144 (1963), test rejected by the Supreme Court for Double Jeopardy analysis). 
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appropriate "punishment" analysis is flexible and context-dependent.  In Morales, the 
Court rejected an ex post facto challenge to a California statute that decreased a 
prisoner's entitlement to parole eligibility hearings.  Under the law in effect at the 
time of the defendant's crime, he was entitled to parole suitability hearings every year 
after his initial parole determination.  Id. at 1600.  The California legislature 
subsequently amended the law to allow the review board to defer subsequent suitability 
hearings if (1) the prisoner has been convicted of "more than one offense which involves 
the taking of a life," and (2) the board "finds that it is not reasonable to expect that 
parole would be granted."  Id. (citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)).  
After finding the defendant unsuitable for parole, the review board invoked this new 
provision to delay his next suitability hearing for three years.  Id.  
 As with the other cases discussed so far, the Court framed the question as 
whether the measure "increased the 'punishment' attached to respondent's crime."  Id.
1601. Rejecting the defendant's claim that this change constituted "punishment," the Court 
distinguished cases holding that legislative changes effectively increasing jail terms 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id.  Unlike the measures in those cases, the Court 
said, the statute at issue "creates only the most speculative and attenuated risk of
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes."  Id. at 1605.  The 
likelihood of parole for those covered -- double murderers -- is "quite remote."  Id.
1603.  Moreover, the "carefully tailored" authority of the board directs it to delay 
hearings only when it concludes that the hearings would be of no avail to the prisoner. 
Id. at 1604. 
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  Morales makes clear that a law can constitute unconstitutional "punishment" 
because of its effects.  The Court leads off its discussion with the declaration that 
"[t]he legislation at issue here effects no change in the definition of respondent's 
crime."  Id. at 1601.  The opinion then spends the bulk of its analysis examining the 
effect of the legislative change on Morales.  See id. at 1601-04.  In doing so, it 
concedes that a measure effectively extending a sentence of imprisonment constitutes 
punishment, presumably regardless of the legislature's motivation.  See id. at 1601 
(citing and distinguishing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937); Miller v. Florida
482 U.S. 423 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)).  Morales concludes that the 
impact on the prisoner was not great enough to warrant finding an ex post facto violation. 
"We have long held," the Court said, "that the question of what legislative adjustments 
will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition must 
be a matter of degree."  Id. at 1603 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
 Morales also highlights the flexibility of the punishment inquiry.  It makes no 
reference or citation to De Veau, Halper, Austin, or Kurth Ranch at all.  This could be 
read as a rejection of those standards in the ex post facto context, but we think that the 
better reading of this mere omission in Morales is that the appropriate "punishment" 
analysis depends on the context.  The Court said as much:  "[W]e have previously declined 
to articulate a single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that have a 
sufficient effect on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional 
prohibition, and we have no occasion to do so here."  Id. (citation omitted).  Morales
not need to discuss Austin and its progeny because the facts in Morales involved 
                     
0We discuss the benchmarks for evaluating the "matter of degree" infra page 69. 
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imprisonment; the Court needed only to discuss and distinguish the most on-point cases of 
Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller, supra.  And in doing so it looked at negative effects on 
Morales as "a matter of degree."  Id.  
 This examination of effects, like the Austin inquiry into history, is necess
to limit what would otherwise be the untenable results of the De Veau subjective purpose 
inquiry and the Halper means-end calculus.  While even a substantial "sting" will not 
render a measure "punishment," see Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7; Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1945 n.14, at some level the "sting" will be so sharp that it can only be considered 
punishment regardless of the legislators' subjective thoughts. For example, the 
legislature, with the purest heart(s), could extend the prison sentences of all previously 
convicted sex offenders for the sole reason of protecting potential future victims.  It 
was simply not understood how dangerous they would be when released, the legislators could 
truthfully explain, and society would be safe only if sex offenders were kept behind bars.  
This remedial purpose would thus fully explain the continued incarceration; in the other 
terms of Halper, the continued imprisonment would be "rationally related" to the goal of 
protecting vulnerable citizens.  But no Justice has ever voted to uphold a statute that 
retroactively increased the term of imprisonment for a past offense.  See Miller v. 
Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). 
 
6. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez: The Inquiry for the Nature of Proceedings 
 
 Finally, before attempting a synthesis, we must briefly discuss the test 
employed by the district court -- which was based on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 37
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144 (1963) -- and explain why we find its approach inappropriate.  In that case, the Court 
held that divesting American citizenship for draft evasion or military desertion was 
"punishment" requiring the procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments:  
"[T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments mandate that this punishment cannot be imposed without a 
prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment, notice, confrontation, 
jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses."  
at 167 (emphasis added).   
 Mendoza-Martinez set forth a multi-factor analysis to determine whether a 
measure constitutes "punishment" triggering criminal process guarantees: 
 
[1] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as punitive, 
[3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] 
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment 
-- retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the burden to which it 
applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to 
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, [7] whether 
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose. 
Id. at 168-69.  The district court applied this test in holding that notification under 
Megan's Law was unconstitutional. 
 However, Supreme Court has made clear that the Mendoza-Martinez test is not 
controlling for the issues in this case. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 n.6.  Although 
Mendoza-Martinez used the word "punishment," Austin explains that the seven factors are 
properly used to determine whether a proceeding is "so punitive that the proceeding must 
reasonably be considered criminal" for purposes of Sixth Amendment trial protections.  
"In addressing the separate question whether punishment is being imposed, the Court has 
not employed the tests articulated in Mendoza-Martinez and Ward."  Id.   
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 Amicus American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) makes a clever argument on this 
point.  The Supreme Court has said that Mendoza-Martinez does not control for 
determinations of whether a civil measure is "punishment."  The ACLU contends that this is 
because the Mendoza-Martinez "test" -- which analyzes whether something is "so punitive" 
as to invoke criminal trial protections -- is harder to prove than the test for mere 
"punishment."  Logically, if a measure is "so punitive" to satisfy the higher Mendoza
Martinez threshold, amicus argues, it should also be "punishment" for purposes of the 
challenges Artway brings, even if the reverse is not true.  
 Nevertheless, like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe, 142 N.J. at 63-73, we 
think it wise to heed the Supreme Court's advice:  Mendoza-Martinez is inapplicable 
outside the context of determining whether a proceeding is sufficiently criminal in nature 
to warrant criminal procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.0  See
                     
0Although the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Doe that Mendoza-Martinez does not 
apply to this analysis, we disagree with that court's approach insofar as it failed to 
take this recognition to its logical conclusion (in addition to its neglect of history 
under Austin and its total disregard of effects).  The Doe Court notes that Mendoza
Martinez does not apply to the relevant "punishment" analysis, but continues to rely on 
other authorities that, like Mendoza-Martinez, pertain to the question of whether a 
proceeding is sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant protection under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments. 
 For example, although the Doe Court nominally applies the Halper and Austin
tests, it loads its analysis with the assertion that "[w]here the stated legislative 
intent is remedial, the burden on those claiming there is a hidden punitive intent is the 
'clearest proof' of that intent."  Doe, 142 N.J. at 162 (citing United States v. Ward
U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).  Ward, like 
Mendoza-Martinez, involves the different question whether a proceeding is effectively 
criminal so that the procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments must apply.  
Ward, therefore, is as inapplicable to this analysis as Mendoza-Martinez itself.  And 
Flemming was decided in the "actual purpose" era of De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 
(1960) (decided the same year).  Halper has since made clear that "the labels 'criminal 
and 'civil' are not of paramount importance." 490 U.S. at 447.  Austin, Kurth Ranch
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Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 n.6. Even when the Court has recited the Mendoza-Martinez
factors, including in Mendoza-Martinez itself, it has played them down. See Mendoza
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 167 (declining to apply its own factors).  It has consistently 
insisted that these factors, really a grab-bag of many individual tests, are neither 
controlling nor dispositive.  See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) ("[T]his 
list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved 
helpful in our own consideration of similar questions and provides some guidance.") 
(emphasis added).  Finally, we think that a seven factor balancing test -- with factors of 
unknown weight that "may often point in differing directions," Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
at 169 -- is too indeterminate and unwieldy to provide much assistance to us here.0
 
B.  Synthesizing the Jurisprudence: The Test(s) 
 Synthesizing these cases, we derive the following analytical framework for this 
case.  A measure must pass a three-prong analysis -- (1) actual purpose, (2) objective
                                                                                          
Morales have further changed the analysis, sensibly we think, to include an increasing 
focus on objective, effect-oriented aspects of the measure in question. 
 The inapplicability of Mendoza-Martinez also refutes New Jersey's argument 
concerning United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  New Jersey argues that Salerno
establishes that even preventive detention does not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
Salerno held that preventive detention, before a trial, was not pre-trial "punishment" in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 755.  The Court reached this conclusion 
through application of the Mendoza-Martinez test.  Id. at 747.  Salerno, therefore, sheds 
little light on the test that we must apply in the context of an ex post facto inquiry.
0Even if we were to apply the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors, they do not support a 
determination that registration constitutes punishment.  Only one factor points toward 
punishment: whether the burden applies to conduct that is already criminal. The other six 
point toward non-punishment.  Even factor (3) --whether the burden is imposed only after 
proof of scienter (criminal intent) -- militates against a finding of "punishment" for 
registration because Megan's Law also applies to those judged not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2a.  
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purpose, and (3) effect -- to constitute non-punishment.  We must look at actual purpose 
to see "whether the legislative aim was to punish."  See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160.  If the 
legislature intended Megan's Law to be "punishment," i.e., retribution was one of its 
actual purposes, then it must fail constitutional scrutiny.  If, on the other hand, "the 
restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation," the 
measure will pass this first prong.  Id. 
 If the legislature's actual purpose does not appear to be to punish, we look 
next to its "objective" purpose.  This prong, in turn, has three subparts.  First, can the 
law be explained solely by a remedial purpose?  See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.  If not, it 
is "punishment."  Second, even if some remedial purpose can fully explain the measure, 
does a historical analysis show that the measure has traditionally been regarded as 
punishment?  See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.  If so, and if the text or legislative 
history does not demonstrate that this measure is not punitive, it must be considered 
"punishment." Third, if the legislature did not intend a law to be retributive but did 
intend it to serve some mixture of deterrent and salutary purposes, we must determine (1) 
whether historically the deterrent purpose of such a law is a necessary complement to its 
salutary operation and (2) whether the measure under consideration operates in its "usual" 
manner, consistent with its historically mixed purposes.  See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1946-48.  Unless the partially deterrent measure meets both of these criteria, it is 
"punishment."  If the measure meets both of these criteria and the deterrent purpose does 
not overwhelm the salutary purpose, it is permissible under Kurth Ranch. 
 Finally, if the purpose tests are satisfied, we must then turn to the effects
the measure.  If the negative repercussions -- regardless of how they are justified 
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great enough, the measure must be considered punishment.  See Morales, 115 S. Ct. at 1603.  
This inquiry, guided by the facts of decided cases, is necessarily one "of degree."  
id.   
  We have thus attempted to harmonize a body of doctrine that has caused much 
disagreement in the federal and state courts.  We realize, however, that our synthesis i
by no means perfect.  Only the Supreme Court knows where all the pieces belong.  The Court 
will, we hope, provide more guidance with its decision in United States v. $405,089.23 
U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 
(1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996), or some other case in the near future.  With 
this qualification in mind, we turn to the application of this test to Megan's Law.
 
C.  The Registration Provisions of Megan's Law Evaluated 
 The registration provisions of Megan's Law are relatively simple.  They require 
"repetitive and compulsive" sex offenders who have completed a sentence for designated 
crimes to register with local law enforcement.  Because Artway meets these requirements, 
he must register if he returns to New Jersey.  In registering, Artway must provide 
information including descriptions of his appearance, his genetic markers, and his 
residence and work place to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which 
he chooses to reside.  He must periodically confirm his residence and notify law 
enforcement if he moves.  Unlike the notification provisions of Megan's Law --which would 
require notice of Artway's crime, his description, his whereabouts, and, critically, the 
State's assessment of his future dangerousness to members of Artway's community --
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registration provides this information only to law enforcement agencies.  The information 
is not open to public inspection.   
 
1. Actual Purpose 
 The first prong of our test asks whether the legislature's actual purpose was to 
punish.  See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160.  The only indication of actual legislative intent 
regarding the enacted version of Megan's Law is the following statement of purpose in the 
legislation itself: 
1. The Legislature finds and declares: 
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who 
commit other predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by 
persons who prey on others as a result of mental illness, require a 
system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to 
identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety. 
 
b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who commit 
other predatory acts against children will provide law enforcement 
with additional information critical to preventing and promptly 
resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.   
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1.  This passage suggests that the legislature's actual purpose was not 
punishment.  It speaks of "identify[ing] and alert[ing] the public" to enhance safety and 
"preventing and promptly resolving incidents."  Protecting the public and preventing 
crimes are the types of purposes De Veau found "regulatory" and not punitive.  363 U.S. at 
160. 
 The only other legislative history, a statement in the bill as introduced in the 
New Jersey Senate, buttresses the conclusion that the legislature's intent was not to 
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punish.  "The danger posed by the presence of a sex offender who has committed violent 
acts against children requires a system of notification to protect the public safety and 
welfare of the community." Senate Bill No. 14 (introduced September 12, 1994).  The 
section literally speaks of "notification," but if the legislature's actual purpose in 
notification was remedial, it is hard to imagine that its purpose in the predicate and 
less harsh step of registration was punitive. 
 The circumstances of this enactment, which generated such sparse legislative 
history, gives us pause.  Megan's Law was rushed to the floor as an extraordinary measure, 
skipping committee consideration and debate entirely.  It is just these "sudden and strong 
passions to which men are exposed" that the Framers designed the Ex Post Facto and Bill of 
Attainder Clauses to protect against.  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137
(1810).  Nevertheless, the evidence we do have of actual legislative intent points to a 
non-punitive purpose. 
 
2. Objective Purpose 
 The objective purpose prong asks three related questions.  First, we must 
discern whether the law can be explained solely by a remedial purpose.  See Halper, 490 
U.S. at 448.  Registration is a common and long-standing regulatory technique with a 
remedial purpose.  See, e.g., New York v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (registration of 
membership corporations and associations permissible); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 
22 (1953) (registration of professional gamblers permissible);  United States v. Harriss
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347 U.S. 612 (1954) (registration of lobbyists permissible).0  One need look no further 
than the Selective Service to find a nonpunitive registration system for individuals.  
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (sustaining selective service system 
against claim that it violated free exercise). 
 Here, the solely remedial purpose of helping law enforcement agencies keep tabs 
on these offenders fully explains requiring certain sex offenders to register.  
Registration may allow officers to prevent future crimes by intervening in dangerous 
situations.  Like the agent who must endure the snow to fetch the soupmeat, the registrant 
may face some unpleasantness from having to register and update his registration.  But the 
remedial purpose of knowing the whereabouts of sex offenders fully explains the 
registration provision just as the need for dinner fully explains the trip out into the 
night.  And the means chosen -- registration and law enforcement notification only 
not excessive in any way.  Registration, therefore, is certainly "reasonably related" to a 
legitimate goal:  allowing law enforcement to stay vigilant against possible re-abuse.  
 Second, we must consider history, and registration does not resemble punishment 
through a historical analysis.  Artway spends much of his brief chronicling the historical 
understanding of public shame as punishment.  "Early forms of punishment contained strong 
elements of gross public humiliation. . . . Physical punishments . . . were carried out 
publicly in ceremonial fashion [because it was] intended that the victim should be 
humiliated, for degradation figured largely in all contemporary theories of punishment."  
                     
0Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1958), invalidated a registration statute, but for 
the different reason that it gave no notice.  The registrant in that case did not bring 
the punishment-oriented claims that Artway makes, apparently because her facts would not
support the other predicates of those challenges (e.g., she committed her offense after 
the enactment of that act). 
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Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter:  A Critical Analysis of Modern 
Probation Conditions, 1989 Duke L.J. 1357, 1360-61 (internal quotations omitted); see
Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 (1885) (cataloguing "punishments that consist 
principally in their ignominy" as set forth in Blackstone's Commentaries); Crime and 
Punishment in American History 40 (explaining that humiliating punishments were 
historically intended to serve as deterrents).   
 In particular, Artway argues that Megan's Law is analogous to that most famous 
badge of punishment:  the Scarlet Letter.  "There can be no outrage . . . against our 
common nature,--whatever be the delinquencies of the individual,--no outrage more flagrant 
than to forbid the culprit to hide his face for shame; as it was the essence of this 
punishment to do." Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter 63-64 (Random House 1950) 
(1850).  Like the Scarlet Letter, Artway contends, Megan's Law results in public ostracism 
and opprobrium:  it would subject him to potential vigilantism, impair his opportunities 
to work, and damage his abilities to develop and maintain stable relationships.  In his 
submission, its "remedial" purpose -- to protect the public from him -- seeks to brand him 
as an outcast. Such a shunning by one's community is the essence of historical punishment, 
Artway contends.    
 Artway's argument has considerable force, but the notification issue is not 
before us.  We evaluate only registration, and that provision bears little resemblance to 
the Scarlet Letter.  Registration simply requires Artway to provide a package of 
information to local law enforcement; registration does not involve public notification.  
Without this public element, Artway's analogy fails.  The Scarlet Letter and other 
punishments of "shame" and "ignominy" rely on the disgrace of an individual before his 
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community.  The act of registering with a discrete government entity, which is not 
authorized to release that information to the community at large (except in emergencies), 
cannot be compared to public humiliation.  The officers who constitute local law 
enforcement, even if they are from Artway's area, would constitute only a de minimis 
portion of that community.  And their ready access to criminal history information is an 
integral part of their jobs, rather than an extraordinary event likely to trigger 
opprobrium. 
 Artway relies on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), to establish that 
even registration is "punishment."  It does not aid his case.  Weems struck down as cruel 
and unusual punishment a Philippine law that imposed horrible punishments for 
falsification of public documents.  Id. at 363.  Any false entry, even if unintentional 
and with no ill effect, triggered the "cadenza temporal."  Id.  This punishment imposed 
hard and painful labor for a period from twelve years and a day to twenty years, shackled 
at the wrist and the ankle, with no access to family or loved ones, the extinguishment of 
civil rights while serving the sentence, perpetual disqualification from political rights, 
such as holding office, and "surveillance."  Id. at 363-64.   
 The Weems Court confronted a different issue from the one in this case.  The 
Court held that this harsh punishment as a whole was cruel and unusual for the relatively 
minor offense involved.  Id. at 382.  And the "surveillance" statute that made up a minor 
part of the total punishment differed from Megan's Law in at least one significant 
respect:  the unfortunate offender in Weems was required to obtain written permission 
before he could move.  See id. at 363.  Given this larger context, the Court's dictum 
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about the harshness of "surveillance" hardly establishes that registration is 
"punishment." 
 Finally, because registration historically is a regulatory technique with a 
salutary purpose, any incidental purpose to deter future offenses by past sex offenders 
will not invalidate it under Kurth Ranch.   
 
3. Effects 
 The final prong examines whether the effects -- or "sting" -- of a measure is so 
harsh "as a matter of degree" that it constitutes "punishment."  See Morales, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1603. The caselaw does not tell us where the line falls that divides permissible from 
impermissible effects, but we know the "matter of degree" is somewhere between 
imprisonment and revocation of citizenship on the one hand, and loss of a profession or 
benefits on the other.  Compare Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987) (increased 
incarceration is "punishment") and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (revoking 
citizenship is "punishment") with De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (forbidding 
work as union official not "punishment"); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) 
(revoking medical license is not "punishment") and Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) 
(terminating social security benefits not "punishment").0 
                     
0Of course, insofar as De Veau, Hawker, and Flemming undertook only an actual purpose 
test, they are methodologically incomplete compared with current law on "punishment."  
Nevertheless, because these cases have not been overruled, we must try to read them 
consistently with current law.  To do so, the measures challenged in these cases must 
survive the subsequent objective purpose and effect tests.  We presume, therefore, that 
these cases must provide benchmarks for permissible effect.  
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 Artway marshals strong reasons that notification would have devastating effects.  
In addition to the ostracism that is part of its very design, notification subjects him to 
possible vigilante reprisals and loss of employment.  And unlike the mere fact of his past 
conviction, which might be learned from an employment questionnaire or public records, 
notification under Megan's Law features the State's determination -- based overwhelmingly 
on past conduct -- that the prior offender is a future danger to the community.0  We 
reemphasize, however, that as forceful as Artway's arguments seem to be, the issue of 
notification is not ripe at this time. 
 On the other hand, registration, the only phase of Megan's Law upon which we may 
pass judgment, has little impact. Most of the information is already available in the 
public record.  It is disclosed only to law enforcement, which has ready access to this 
criminal history.  And, unlike notification, the information contains no assessment by the 
State that Artway is a future danger.  Therefore, this impact, even coupled with the 
registrant's inevitable kowtow to law enforcement officials, cannot be said to have an 
effect so draconian that it constitutes "punishment" in any way approaching incarceration.  
It is less harsh than losing a profession or benefits.  
 While there doubtless are some unpleasant consequences of registration --
possible that police will leak information or engage in official harassment -- we must 
presume that law enforcement will obey the law.  Moreover, Artway, who of course bears the 
burden of proof to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds, presents no evidence in 
this record of dire consequences flowing from registration.    
                     
0Past criminal conduct is the basis of 90 of the possible 111 points in the Registrant 
Risk Assessment Scale. 
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D.  Summary of Registration Claims 
 Analyzing the registration provisions of Megan's Law under the (1) actual 
purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3) effects prongs of our "punishment" test, we 
conclude that registration under Megan's Law does not constitute "punishment" under any 
measure of the term.  Hence, it does not offend the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, or 
Bill of Attainder Clauses. Therefore, although our analysis differs from that employed by 
the district court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, we agree with their conclusion 
regarding registration.     
 
VI.   EQUAL PROTECTION 
 Turning to the remainder of Artway's claims, we begin by rejecting his argument 
that Megan's Law violates equal protection.  Artway contends that Megan's Law's 
distinction between "compulsive and repetitive" sex offenders and other sex offenders is 
"arbitrary and discriminatory."  However, the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all 
discrimination, and the distinctions made by Megan's Law are not arbitrary.   
 The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  
This is not a command that all persons be treated alike but, rather, "a direction that all 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike."  City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (emphasis added).  The level of scrutiny applied 
to ensure that classifications comply with this guarantee differs depending on the nature 
of the classification. Classifications involving suspect or quasi-suspect class, or 
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impacting certain fundamental constitutional rights, are subject to heightened scrutiny.  
Id.  Other classifications, however, need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
government goal. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (applying rational 
basis test to classification based on nature of offense). 
 Megan's Law requires persons who have committed their offense and completed all 
incarceration, probation and parole by the date the Law was enacted to register only if 
they were found to be "repetitive and compulsive" at sentencing.  The challenged category 
-- "repetitive and compulsive sex offenders" -- is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (listing classes receiving heightened scrutiny as race, 
alienage, national origin, and sex).  It also does not implicate a fundamental 
constitutional right for which the Supreme Court has granted heightened equal protection 
scrutiny.  See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. at 465 (applying rational basis test to 
classification based on nature of offense).  This classification, therefore, "is subject 
to the general rule that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing cases). 
 Registration easily satisfies this requirement. Protecting vulnerable 
individuals from sexual offenses is certainly a legitimate state interest.  Requiring 
registration of convicted sex offenders found to be "repetitive and compulsive," as 
opposed to other sex offenders or the rest of the population, is rationally related to 
that goal.  See, e.g., State v. Wingler, 25 N.J. 161, 176 (1957) (holding that 
classification of repetitive and compulsive sex offenders "has a rational basis"); 
v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying rational basis test to hold that 
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Arkansas statute excluding sex offenders from work/study release program for inmates did 
not violate equal protection).  The legislature could have rationally concluded that sex 
offenders who had completed all incarceration, probation and parole had a good chance of 
reintegrating into their communities and therefore posed a lower risk.  Also, realizing 
that people who had rejoined society had the most to lose, the legislature could have 
rationally decided to require only "repetitive and compulsive" offenders in this ca
to register.  Thus, this classification does not offend equal protection. 
 Artway's reliance on Foucha v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), as establishing 
heightened scrutiny in this case is misplaced.  Foucha held that a state statute allowing 
continued confinement of an individual acquitted by reason of insanity, even when that 
person had ceased to be mentally ill, violated due process.  Id. at 78-83.  A plurality 
indicated that doing so was also an equal protection violation.  Id. at 84-85.  But, 
unlike Megan's Law, the statute in Foucha denied those subject to it of their physical
liberty, which the Court has recognized as a fundamental constitutional right triggering 
heightened scrutiny. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).0   
 
VII.  DUE PROCESS 
 We also reject Artway's contention that Megan's Law denies due process by 
classifying former offenders on the basis of "repetitive and compulsive behavior."  This 
argument has two subparts.  First, Artway argues that requiring him to register on the 
                     
0Moreover, the heightened scrutiny the plurality hints at --"the State must have a 
particularly convincing reason," id. at 85 -- was probably unnecessary to decide the equal 
protection issue: The classification of insanity acquittees was so underinclusive that it 
was not even rational. 
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basis of the "repetitive and compulsive" finding violates due process because the finding 
was unreliable when made.  The supposed unreliability stems from an alleged lack of 
training of the State employees making these determinations.  Second, he contends, holding 
him accountable for this determination violates due process because he did not have notice 
at the time of sentencing of the negative implications of this finding.  Artway admits 
that he was advised of his right to contest the "repetitive and compulsive" finding, but 
contends that such a finding was in his interest because it was his only hope for 
obtaining treatment and being placed in a treatment center, safe from the general prison 
population.   
 Although he does not spell out why using the "repetitive and compulsive" finding 
against him would amount to a due process deprivation, we will assume he means that such 
actions would be "fundamentally unfair."  Cf. Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Petitioners must show that [the state procedures] contain a 
defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a 
defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without du
process."). 
 But even this argument has no merit.  We need not reach the issue of the 
fairness -- whether because of unreliability or lack of incentive to oppose -- of the 
"repetitive and compulsive" finding.  One must have an interest in life, liberty, or 
property before due process protections are triggered.  U.S. Const. amend. IV, § 1; 
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).  Artway has no such interest in the 
reputational damage, if any, that accompanies registration.  See Doe, 142 N.J. at 10
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (holding mere damage to reputation insufficient to 
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trigger due process); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding harm to 
reputation and financial interests insufficient to confer liberty interest). And at this 
stage, the "repetitive and compulsive" finding subjects him to no more than registration.
 Artway may have a liberty interest in notification under state law triggering 
federal due process protections.  See Doe, 142 N.J. at 103-106.  But, as explained 
Part IV, his challenges to notification are not yet ripe. 
 
VIII. UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS 
 Artway next argues that Megan's Law is unconstitutionally vague because it 
forces him to "guess" whether he is covered by the Act.  We disagree.  Due process 
requires only that a penal statute give persons of "common intelligence" fair notice about 
"what the State commands or forbids."  Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).  
While Artway appears to style his complaint as a facial challenge, he has standing only to 
raise the vagueness of the Act as it applies to him unless he can prove that the Act is 
vague in substantially all its applications.  See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982); United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 
92 (1975).  Because Artway does not, and cannot, establish that Megan's Law is vague in 
                     
0We express no opinion regarding whether Artway may be able to challenge his "repetitive 
and compulsive" finding at a notification hearing if, in fact, he is ever slated for 
notification.  We also express no opinion about whether Artway may be able to avoid 
registration, on a basis other than due process, if he can prove that the "repetitive and 
compulsive" finding was never valid. Finally, we do not opine on the related question 
which is not now posed by Artway in these terms -- whether he may on some theory be able 
to avoid (or to terminate the need for) registration if he can prove that the original 
"repetitive and compulsive" finding no longer has any current validity. 
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substantially all its applications, we deal only with the provisions of Megan's Law 
they apply to him.0 
 Under the relevant section of Megan's Law, a person who has been convicted of a 
"sex offense" must register.  Paragraph (1) of that section defines "sex offense" to 
include "aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault . . . if the court found that the 
offender's conduct was characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior."  
Paragraph (3) of that section further defines "sex offense" to include "a sentence on the 
basis of criteria similar to the criteria set forth in paragraph (1) . . . entered or 
imposed under the laws of the United States, this state or another state."  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. 2c:7-1b. (emphasis added).   
 The crux of Artway's argument is that the "sentenced on the basis of criteria 
similar to" language violates due process by not specifying the predicate crimes more 
clearly.  But Artway's duty to register is patent under the Act.  Megan's Law requires 
registration for those sentenced under "similar criteria" to "aggravated sexual assault, 
sexual assault . . . if the court found that the offender's conduct was characterized by a 
pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior."  N.J. Stat. Ann. 2c:7-1b.  Thus, Artway 
must register if he was sentenced for engaging in (1) "sexual assault" and (2) "repetitive 
and compulsive" behavior. 
                     
0We also decline to address Artway's argument, made in his brief to this Court, that 
Megan's Law does not apply to him as a matter of New Jersey law.  We almost certainly 
cannot grant Artway's requested relief -- an injunction against state officials from 
enforcing this law -- on this basis.  See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman
U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from enjoining 
state officials from violating state law).  Moreover, confronted with the Pennhurst
problem, Artway has disclaimed this claim for relief, going so far as to insist at oral 
argument and in a subsequent letter memorandum that it was never his intention to seek 
such relief from this Court. 
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 Artway argues (in so many words) that, because the crime of sodomy did not 
require an element of violence at the time he was convicted, it is unclear whether he 
falls under the "sexual assault" requirement.  The statutory elements of the crime, 
however, are a red herring.  Artway was sentenced under New Jersey's prior sex offender 
law, which required a finding of both "violence" and "repetitive and compulsive behavior."  
In particular, the sentencing judge made a finding at sentencing that Artway used violence 
to perpetrate a sexual act.  See Artway v. Pallone, 672 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
1982) (describing crime).  This is plainly sexual assault.  The sentencing judge also 
found that Artway had engaged in "repetitive and compulsive" behavior.  See id.  Thus, 
Artway received "a sentence on the basis of criteria" similar to both elements of 
paragraph (1).  Because the statute facially applies to Artway, he could reasonably know 
of his duty to register.   
 Artway's citation to Hluchan v. Fauver, 482 F. Supp. 1155 (D.N.J. 1980), is of 
no avail.  Even if we found the reasoning of Fauver persuasive, it is inapposite.  That 
case involved an equal protection challenge to regulations that classified prisoners for 
purpose of minimum custody eligibility. Id. at 1156.  The rationality of the open-ended 
regulations was at issue, not the fair notice question of this vagueness claim (a due 
process challenge).  Moreover, the regulation in Fauver was objectionable for three 
reasons not present in this case.  First, unlike Megan's Law, the Fauver regulations 
initially left "sex offense" completely undefined (thus undermining its rationality). 
at 1157.  Second, the regulations contained a provision not present in Megan's Law for 
which the court was unable to "determine the meaning."  Id.  Finally, the incorporation of 
"sex offenses" from other states presented an equal protection problem, the court thought, 
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because "the danger exists that individuals convicted of the same criminal conduct in 
different jurisdictions will be treated differently."  Id.  We doubt the soundness of 
finding equal protection violations on the basis of "dangers" that have not come to pass 
but, in any event, Artway was convicted under the laws of the State of New Jersey and 
faces no problem with the applicability of laws of other states.   
 
IX.   PULLMAN ABSTENTION 
 Finally, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to abstain 
under Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  Pullman abstention allows 
federal courts, in rare cases, to abstain from deciding a case if a state court's 
resolution of a state law issue would obviate the need for the federal court to reach a 
federal constitutional issue.  The doctrine attempts to avoid constitutional questions and 
promote principles of federalism.  However, Pullman abstention "is an extraordinary and 
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly 
before it [which] can be justified . . . only in exceptional circumstances."  Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting 
Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).   
 Under our jurisprudence, a district court must make three findings in order to 
justify the Pullman exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear cases 
properly brought within their jurisdiction.  The Court must find (1) that uncertain issues 
of state law underlie the federal constitutional claims brought in the district court; (2) 
that the state law issues are amenable to a state court interpretation that would obviate 
the need for, or substantially narrow, adjudication of the federal claim; and (3) that 
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important state policies would be disrupted through a federal court's erroneous 
construction of state law.  See Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 631 
(3d Cir. 1991).  If all three factors are present, the federal court must then consider 
whether abstention is appropriate by weighing such factors as the availability of an 
adequate state remedy, the length of time the litigation has been pending, and the impact 
of delay on the litigants.  Id. at 633. 
 Abstention is not warranted here.  First, although a state law issue -- whet
Megan's Law applies to him --underlies the federal constitutional claim, this issue is not 
"uncertain" because Megan's Law clearly applies to him.  See Part VIII supra.  Second, 
because the applicability of Megan's Law to Artway is patent, this issue is not "amenable" 
to a state law determination that would obviate the need for a federal constitutional 
determination.  The Supreme Court has used various formulations to describe 
"amenability,"0 but no matter which we adopt, the lack of uncertainty about the state law 
issue precludes satisfaction of this prong: a certain issue is not "amenable" to a 
contrary interpretation.  The third factor --whether an improper interpretation of state 
law would disrupt important state policies -- favors the state because the scope of 
Megan's Law is an important state issue.0  Nevertheless, two of the three essential 
                     
0See Biegenwald v. Fauver, 882 F.2d 748, 752 n.3 (quoting 17A Charles A. Wright et al.
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4242, at 42-44 (1988)).  A leading commentator has 
interpreted the Supreme Court's typical formulation of amenability -- that the law be 
"fairly subject" to a state court interpretation eliminating the constitutional issues 
as establishing a fairly high threshold requiring a "substantial possibility" that a state 
interpretation would obviate the need for a federal constitutional decision. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 692-93 (1994).   
0This Court reviews district court decisions on this factor under an abuse of discreti
standard if they are "adequately explained."  See Hughes v. Lipscher, 906 F.2d 961, 965 
(3d Cir. 1990).  Here, the district court provided no explanation about why significant 
state policies would not be interfered with by an erroneous decision about the scope of 
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factors for abstention are lacking even before we come to the weighing factors; hence, 
Pullman abstention is inappropriate. 
 
X.    CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the lion's share of Artway's claims are 
unripe.  In particular, we will dismiss as unripe Artway's claims (1) that the 
notification provisions of Megan's Law violate the Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder,
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) that the State must provide 
Artway more process for receiving notice of and challenging the notification 
determination.  We also hold unripe the claim of the Chief of Police of Woodbridge 
Township that state immunity bars his "potential liability" for a hypothetical § 1983 
action seeking damages.  
 With regard to Artway's claims that are currently justiciable, we hold that (1) 
the registration component of Megan's Law does not violate the Ex Post Facto, Double 
Jeopardy or Bill of Attainder Clauses as impermissible "punishment"; (2) the "repetitive 
and compulsive" classification of Megan's Law does not offend equal protection; (3) the 
alleged unreliability and unfairness of Artway's "repetitive and compulsive" determination 
does not violate due process; and (4) Megan's Law is not unconstitutionally vague as 
                                                                                          
Megan's Law.  See Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 670 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995).  It 
concluded simply that because Artway "is facing a criminal penalty if he does not register 
today . . . [,] any argument for abstention obviously fails."  Id.  Thus, the district 
court appears to have skipped straight to the discretionary balancing of hardships.  We 
agree that the equities favor Artway, but this weighing is necessary -- and appropriate 
only if the three requirements for abstention are met.                
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applied to him.  Finally, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to 
abstain under Pullman. 
 The judgment of the district court will be vacated insofar as it enjoins the 
enforcement of Tier 2 and Tier 3 notification under Megan's Law, and affirmed insofar as 
it holds the registration provisions (including Tier 1) of the Law constitutional.  The 
parties shall bear their own costs. 
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 SHADUR, Senior District Judge, concurring: 
 At the outset I should emphasize that this brief concurrence reflects no 
disagreement with the results that have been announced in Judge Becker's detailed and 
masterful treatment of the enormously complex subject matter that we have been called upon 
to deal with here.  To the contrary, both the ultimate resolution of each substantive 
issue posed by the record before us and (with the limited exception set out here) the 
reasoning by which those results have been reached are the subject of our panel's 
unanimous agreement.  Instead I write only to express the view (which is dealt with in 
somewhat different form in n.16 of the majority opinion) that United States v. Halper
not play the precise role that the majority's exposition suggests in analyzing the concept 
of "punishment." 
 This is not at all a matter of "[c]abining Halper to monetary penalties," as 
n.24 of the majority opinion describes the First Circuit's recent opinion in United States 
v. Stoller. Any efforts of the lower courts in the federal system to interpret the 
sometimes Delphic pronouncements from the Supreme Court can on occasion resemble (to mix 
metaphors) the divination of entrails.  When two such able and respected judges as Judge 
Becker and the First Circuit's Judge Bruce Selya come to such differing conclusions as to 
the meaning and significance of a single Supreme Court opinion in the type of synthesis 
that each of them has attempted in the course of defining "punishment" for double jeopardy 
purposes, that very difference creates a strong implication that the oracular message from 
the ultimate authority ranks high in the scale of obscurity.  With some trepidation, I 
should like to add a few comments in a further effort to explicate Halper. 
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 It is worth repeating the two consecutive sentences in Halper, 490 U.S. at 448
49 (citation omitted) that have the puzzling appearance of looking in opposite directions, 
based on their seemingly odd usage and placement of the word "only" in each of the 
sentences: 
From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come 
to understand the term.  We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause 
a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be 
subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction 
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution. 
 
In surface terms that usage appears to leave a gap, a no-man's land, with the first of the 
sentences saying that a civil sanction is punitive (and is hence outlawed on double 
jeopardy principles) unless it serves only a remedial purpose, and the second saying that 
a civil sanction is impermissible for double jeopardy purposes solely to the extent that 
it serves only deterrent or retributive functions rather than being remedial. But I agree 
with the majority's n.16 that those sentences can be reconciled--though to me the critical 
element of that reconciliation is in the phrase "to the extent that," which I have 
therefore also underscored for emphasis.  Although the difference may be subtle, it is I 
believe significant.  Let me amplify. 
 In the process of synthesizing Halper and Kurth Ranch (which I agree represents the 
proper approach), it seems to me to be critical to recognize the context in which the 
Halper court spoke.  As already stated, Halper did deal with a monetary penalty.  Although 
that is not of course a basis for restricting the case's significance solely to such 
monetary types of "punishment" or non-"punishment," it does help to explain the 
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significance of the "to the extent" language in the earlier-quoted excerpt from Halper
If for example a $100,000 forfeiture of property of a previously-convicted defendant is 
imposed, one "that does not remotely approximate the Government's damages and actual 
costs, [so that] rough justice becomes clear injustice" (Halper, 490 US. at 446), it runs 
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause precisely because of that excessiveness.  That is, 
such excessiveness triggers the Halper language that double jeopardy is involved "to the 
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution" (id. at 449). 
 Just so with Judge Becker's soupmeat analogy.  If a previously-convicted defendant is 
sent out for soupmeat armed with appropriate protection against the elements (snow and 
cold), no double jeopardy concerns are implicated.  But the answer is different when the 
circumstances are changed to include the unjustified deprivation of warm clothing and 
boots.  Why? Because the previously-convicted person "may not be subjected to [that] 
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be 
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution" (id.). 
 Where I believe the majority analysis presents difficulties is not in the area of 
monetary sanctions or in the hypothetical situation in which a sanction may be carved up 
(like soupmeat?) into discrete elements, but in extending that approach to situations in 
which the second sanction does not lend itself to such a convenient parsing out or 
splitting (in the manner that is true both of a monetary penalty, part of which can be 
labeled as remedial and part of which may exceed what is needed for remedial purposes, and 
of the soupmeat example, which can also readily be separated into different components of 
the sanction).  It is in that respect that I respectfully suggest that the first quoted 
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sentence from Halper cannot be isolated from the next one--that Halper should not be 
perceived as a pronouncement that as to every type of sanction, "punishment" (with its 
potential effect for double jeopardy purposes) is involved unless the sanction can be 
explained entirely without ascribing to it some retributive or deterrent component.
 As the majority opinion correctly says at page 65: 
Here, the solely remedial purpose of helping law enforcement agencies keep tabs 
on these offenders fully explains requiring certain sex offenders to register.
 
And it is equally correct to say that this "solely remedial" characterization is not 
altered by the fact that Artway may legitimately perceive registration as imposing 
deterrent or retributive consequences on him (as Halper itself states, 490 U.S. at 447 
n.7, "On the contrary, our cases have acknowledged that for the defendant even remedial 
sanctions carry the sting of punishment"). 
 But having said all of this, I again stress that it is unnecessary to our unanimous 
conclusion about the validity of the registration provisions of Megan's Law--a conclusion 
that follows from the just-stated determination that those provisions are purely 
remedial--to go on to decide what our conclusion would have been if we had determined that 
they were partially retributive or deterrent as well.  It is worth remembering that 
itself contained a caveat against universalizing the rule that it announced.  Here is what 
it said later down the page from the language quoted both by the majority opinion and in 
this concurrence (490 U.S. at 449-50): 
What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one 
before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge 
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has 
caused.  The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sustained a 
criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears 
no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, 
but rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, 
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then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and 
costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second 
punishment. 
 
   On the other hand, I certainly agree with the majority that Halper contributes 
importantly to the total analysis, both by its acknowledgement that "civil" penalties may 
constitute punishment (id. at 447-48) and by adding the concept of objective inquiry to 
that analysis (id. at 447).  So this concurrence concludes as it began, with a total 
joinder in the conclusions reached in Judge Becker's fine opinion for the majority, and 
with a departure from that opinion's reasoning only in terms of voicing a suggested 
caveat--a caution against ascribing an excessive degree of importance to one portion of 
the language quoted from Halper in the effort to forge a total synthesis of the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence for all future double jeopardy analyses. 
